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Ten Years of WIA Research
Paul T. Decker
Mathematica Policy Research
To remain competitive in today’s global economy, U.S. workers 
increasingly need a strong foundation in core work competencies and 
advanced technical skills. In the past two decades, however, concerns 
have mounted about the widening gap between U.S. employers’ need 
for skilled labor and the availability of workers with the requisite skills. 
In one national survey, more than 80 percent of U.S. manufacturers 
reported a shortage of skilled workers, and nearly half viewed the skill 
levels of their employees as poor (National Association of Manufactur-
ers and Deloitte Consulting 2005). This skills shortage contributes to 
the growing earnings gap between those who are educated and skilled 
and those who are not (Heckman and Krueger 2003; Katz and Autor 
1999; Lemieux 2006a,b). The continuing poor performance of U.S. 
youth—compared to their counterparts in other countries—in mathe-
matics, science, and literacy suggests that the skills shortage is unlikely 
to attenuate in the near future (U.S. Department of Education 2004). 
In response to rising concerns about our nation’s ability to meet 
these growing demands on the U.S. workforce, Congress made historic 
reforms to the public workforce investment system in 1998, and enacted 
WIA. Congress viewed WIA as a way to end “business as usual” in the 
workforce investment system. WIA consolidated JTPA’s fragmented 
system of employment and training programs and provided universal 
access to basic services. It also promoted customer choice, gave state 
and local agencies more fl exibility in service design, strengthened local 
accountability for customer outcomes, engaged businesses, and funda-
mentally changed the services provided to youth. WIA is currently the 
largest source of federally funded employment and training, serving 
over 2 million people annually through its Adult, Dislocated Worker, 
and Youth programs, at a cost of $3 billion (U.S. Department of Labor 
2007).
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This chapter describes the existing research on WIA and related 
programs. During the implementation of WIA, the USDOL initiated 
three large studies of the new program: 1) the National Evaluation of 
WIA Implementation (D’Amico et al. 2005); 2) the Evaluation of the 
ITA/Eligible Training Provider Demonstration (D’Amico and Salz-
man 2004); and 3) the ITA Experiment (McConnell et al. 2006). Other 
studies have focused on implementation and early operations of the 
program as well as impacts on participants. Studies of earlier programs, 
including JTPA, may also have relevance for assessing the potential 
benefi ts of WIA. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss fi ndings from studies of 
WIA implementation and early operations. The next two sections re-
view estimated effects of WIA and related programs on the earnings 
and employment of participants, including both the adult and dislocated 
worker target populations. Then I describe fi ndings from the ITA Ex-
periment, which assessed the effects of different models for structuring 
and administering ITAs, the training vouchers used under WIA to fund 
training. The fi nal section provides a summary and interpretation of the 
fi ndings.
RESEARCH ON WIA IMPLEMENTATION 
Several studies have examined implementation of WIA during the 
six years after it became fully operational.1 My summary of the major 
fi ndings from these studies is organized around seven key principles of 
the WIA program. 
1) Service coordination. WIA has generally succeeded in in-
creasing service coordination through local One-Stop service 
centers, but there have been challenges. Perhaps the greatest 
has been determining the appropriate contribution of various 
program partners to support the One-Stop infrastructure; to 
date, WIA’s mandatory partners have made only limited fi nan-
cial contributions. Other challenges to coordination include 
confl icting goals among partners and practical obstacles that 
impede partnerships, such as lack of common data systems. 
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2) Customer empowerment. Local workforce investment agencies 
have enthusiastically embraced customer choice by offering a 
wide range of core and intensive services and establishing ITAs 
to facilitate customer choice of training. However, use of the 
eligible training provider list (ETPL) has had its weaknesses. 
For example, some providers have been unwilling to supply the 
information required to be on the list, and others have furnished 
data of questionable reliability (D’Amico and Salzman 2004).
3) Universal access. State and local agencies have made great 
progress toward the goal of universal access. It has been chal-
lenging, however, for states to provide adequate core services 
with available resources. Tensions have arisen between empha-
sizing core and intensive services for a wide range of customers 
and providing more extensive training for a smaller group. 
Reaching the most disadvantaged customers—including those 
with limited English profi ciency, ex-offenders, those with lim-
ited computer literacy, and residents of sparsely populated rural 
areas—has also been diffi cult (Dunham 2003). 
4) Accountability. Offi cials at state and local agencies expressed 
the following concerns about WIA’s performance measures as 
fi rst implemented: the 17 performance goals were too numer-
ous and complex, the data used to measure performance were 
of uncertain reliability and received too late by agencies to use 
in managing the program, and local agencies tended to focus on 
“managing” the performance system to “make the numbers.” 
Responding to these issues and the need for common perfor-
mance measures in a wide range of programs, the USDOL 
replaced WIA performance measures in 2005 with the Com-
mon Measures. These measures apply to the performance of all 
Labor Department programs administered by the Employment 
and Training Administration, as well as employment and train-
ing programs administered by other federal departments.2
5) Engaging the private sector. Workforce agencies’ level of suc-
cess in connecting with the private sector has varied. Some 
have been successful, but others are struggling with engaging 
businesses in planning and providing them with high-quality 
services. 
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6) Local fl exibility. States and local agencies have embraced the 
fl exibility WIA provides; as a result, service design and delivery 
structures vary markedly. Particularly large differences across 
sites occur in how adults and dislocated workers move through 
the system’s tiered service levels, how priority for target groups 
is established, and how much emphasis is placed on training. 
7) Youth program improvement. WIA’s changes to youth pro-
grams have generally been implemented. Nonetheless, agencies 
have faced challenges in identifying eligible providers of youth 
services, fi nding and retaining at-risk, out-of-school youth, 
verifying and documenting WIA eligibility, locating qualifi ed 
mentors, enlisting youth and parents to serve on youth councils, 
and using interim performance measures.
RESEARCH ON THE IMPACTS OF WIA AND RELATED 
PROGRAMS ON DISADVANTAGED ADULTS
Although no large-scale experimental evaluation of WIA’s impacts 
on participants has been conducted to date, some recent nonexperimen-
tal studies, described below, shed light on the impacts on participant 
employment and earnings. Furthermore, a long history of research on 
related employment and training programs can help assess WIA’s likely 
effects. Much of this earlier research has been summarized elsewhere 
(see LaLonde [1995] and King [2004], for example), so here I focus 
most of my attention on the recent work.
Pre-1995 Evidence
Studies of WIA and its predecessors—MDTA, CETA, and JTPA—
and other employment and training programs targeted to disadvantaged 
workers date back to the 1970s. LaLonde (1995) summarizes research 
generated prior to 1995. Evidence from these studies suggests that 
earlier government training programs generated modest increases in 
participant earnings. For example, LaLonde argues that the studies of 
MDTA and CETA show that these programs increased postprogram 
earnings for disadvantaged adult women but had mixed or even nega-
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tive effects on disadvantaged men. Based on this evidence, LaLonde 
concludes that conventional employment and training services pro-
vided by WIA’s predecessors benefi ted women, but other and perhaps 
more intensive services were needed for men. 
For disadvantaged women, experimental evidence summarized by 
LaLonde demonstrates that earnings gains are generated by a variety 
of employment and training strategies—including some that are quite 
inexpensive—and that gains, although modest, can persist for several 
years. Programs associated with successful outcomes for women include 
the National Supported Work Demonstration, which tested a supported 
work experience strategy to increase long-term AFDC recipients’ earn-
ings (Hollister, Kemper, and Maynard 1984). Furthermore, Supported 
Work’s positive effects on earnings persisted for at least seven years 
(Couch 1992) after the program ended. Some low-cost job search as-
sistance interventions have also been found to signifi cantly increase the 
postprogram earning of disadvantaged women, and in some cases the 
effects have been surprisingly persistent (Friedlander 1988).   
Post-1995 Evidence
A critical turning point in the creation of evidence on the effi cacy 
of employment and training programs was USDOL’s National JTPA 
Study (Bloom et al. 1993). The study used a research design based on 
random assignment of applicants to a treatment group offered JTPA 
services or to a control group denied access to JTPA. Furthermore, the 
study sample was intended to be nationally representative, so that fi nd-
ings could be generalized to the program nationwide. This was one of 
the fi rst large-scale efforts to assess the effects of an ongoing national 
workforce development program using random assignment. Although 
the study was unsuccessful in recruiting a nationally representative 
sample, the researchers succeeded in implementing the random assign-
ment design and obtaining internally valid and reliable estimates of the 
JTPA programs overall as well as impacts of different service strategies. 
Findings from the National JTPA Study showed that the program 
generated a modest increase in the earnings and employment of both 
disadvantaged women and men who enrolled in the program. Bloom 
et al. (1997) reported that JTPA increased total earnings among women 
enrollees by an average of $2,738 (converted to 2005 dollars) over the 
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10 quarters following random assignment (see top of Table 11.1). For 
disadvantaged men, JTPA generated a somewhat smaller increase in 
earnings—$2,383, on average. As a percentage of control group means, 
the earnings increase for women—which was 15 percent—was sub-
stantially larger than the increase for men—8 percent. After accounting 
for program costs, the net benefi ts per enrollee, reported in the fi nal col-
umn of Table 11.1, were nearly identical for women ($763 per enrollee) 
and men ($781 per enrollee). Estimated impacts on postassignment em-
ployment rates, reported in Bloom et al. (1993), were also modest. For 
women, JTPA increased the rate of employment over the six quarters 
after random assignment by 3.5 percentage points, while the impact for 
men was a bit larger at 4.8 percent.
In the national study, JTPA counselors referred eligible applicants 
to one of three service strategies—1) classroom training in occupational 
skills, 2) a mix of on-the-job training (OJT) and job search assistance 
(JSA), and 3) other services, which could include job search assistance, 
basic education, work experience, or other miscellaneous offerings, but 
not classroom training in occupational skills or OJT. Bloom et al. (1997) 
found that the estimated impacts of JTPA on adult enrollees varied a bit 
by service strategy subgroup, at least for women, as shown in Table 
11.1. For women, the OJT/JSA strategy and the other services strat-
egy produced signifi cantly positive impacts, increasing earnings per 
enrollee by $3,416 and $5,886, respectively. In contrast, the point esti-
mate for the group recommended to classroom training in occupational 
skills was substantially smaller, at $939, and not statistically signifi cant. 
For men, the estimates were moderate and consistently positive across 
the three service strategies; however, none of these estimates was statis-
tically signifi cant, even though the overall impact estimate for men was 
positive and statistically signifi cant.     
Subsequent analyses of the National JTPA Study sample by the 
GAO (1996) highlight the persistence of JTPA impacts on earnings. The 
GAO extended the follow-up period for measuring program impacts 
by compiling Social Security earnings records on the sample mem-
bers, which allowed calculation of JTPA impacts fi ve to six years after 
random assignment. The analyses demonstrate that earnings impacts 
persisted beyond the fi rst 10 postassignment quarters in the original 
study. Over the fi rst fi ve to six years postassignment, JTPA increased 
earnings by an average of $4,021 per woman assigned to the treatment 
up11dbwia0ch11.indd   320 6/23/2011   11:38:20 AM
Ten Years of WIA Research   321
group and $3,996 per man. Because only about two-thirds of assign-
ees actually enrolled in JTPA, the long-run effects per enrollee were 
larger—over $5,000, on average, for both women and men.
After WIA replaced JTPA in 1998, a number of studies attempted 
to examine impacts related to the new program. An early example is the 
ITA Experiment, sponsored by the USDOL to examine the relative ef-
fects of different methods of administering ITAs, the primary vehicle for 
funding training under WIA. The experiment, discussed in more detail 
below, was based on a research design in which WIA training applicants 
were randomly assigned to three ITA models being tested. In contrast 
to the National JTPA Study, the ITA Experiment made no attempt to 
deny services to any applicants. In the past year, however, the USDOL 
initiated a new experimental study of WIA impacts, based on random 
assignment of applicants to a group that has access to all WIA services 
or to one or more groups with limited or no access (similar to what was 
done in the National JTPA Study). The study (Bellotti et al. 2009) is 
designed to measure the impacts and cost-effectiveness of WIA services 
on the adult, dislocated worker, and youth populations. It is based on a 
nationally representative sample of WIA applicants, similar to what was 
intended in the National JTPA Study, to generate impact estimates that 
are representative of the program as it operates across the country. 
Study designs that include random assignment provide unbiased 
estimates of WIA impacts with a known degree of precision, based on 
differences in outcomes between treatment and control groups. How-
ever, the need to randomly assign new WIA applicants requires time to 
build the needed sample and measure the outcomes of interest over an 
appropriate observation period. It will be at least a few years before the 
new experimental study will generate useful impact estimates.
In contrast, studies that do not rely on random assignment can work 
with retrospective data to measure outcomes for prior WIA applicants 
and matched comparison groups, assuming such data are available. The 
program administrative data in the Workforce Investment Act Standard-
ized Record Data (WIASRD) can be combined with state UI claims 
records, state UI wage records, and state ES records to support this kind 
of retrospective research. Two groups of researchers—one led by Caro-
lyn Heinrich (Heinrich et al. 2009) and one led by Kevin Hollenbeck 
(Hollenbeck et al. 2005; Hollenbeck 2009)—have used administrative 
data to conduct nonexperimental studies of WIA impacts on participant 





Estimated mean effects or range of effects
(per enrollee unless noted)
Estimated social net 
benefi ts per enrollee
JTPA Bloom et al. (1997) Women $2,738*** total earnings in 10 quarters after
assignment (15 percent of control group mean)
$763





Women $939 total earnings
Men $1,918 total earnings
OJT/job search assistance
Women $3,416** total earnings
Men $2,109 total earnings
Other services
Women $5,886*** total earnings
Men $1,403 total earnings
Bloom et al. (1993)a Women 0.0 to 5.3 percent employed per quarter over 6
quarters after assignment (3.5 percent employed
anytime in 6 quarters)
Men 1.9 to 8.9 percent employed per quarter over 6 
quarters after assignment (4.8 percent employed 
anytime in 6 quarters)
GAO (1996)a Women $4,021 total earnings per assignee over 5 to 6 years 
after assignment; 1.3 to 3.1 percent employed per 
year over 5 years after year of assignment
Table 11.1  Estimated Effects of WIA and Related Programs on Earnings and Employment of Disadvantaged Adults
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Men $3,996 total earnings per assignee over 5 to 6 years 
after assignment; 0.3 to 3.7 percent employed per 
year over 5 years after year of assignment
WIA Heinrich et al. (2009) WIA overall
Women $482*** to $638*** per quarter for 16 quarters post-
entry; 5.0** to 13.1** percent employed per quarter
Men $320*** to $692*** per quarter for 16 quarters post-
entry; 4.9** to 11.8** percent employed per quarter
WIA core/intensive
Women $216*** to $575*** per quarter; 3.5** to 14.6** 
percent employed per quarter
Men $148* to $673*** per quarter; 4.6** to 12.3** 
percent employed per quarter
WIA training vs. WIA 
core/intensive
Women −$223*** to $928*** per quarter; −5.6** to 9.5** 
percent employed per quarter
Men $194** to $1,301** per quarter; −2.0** to 13.5** 
percent employed per quarter
Hollenbeck et al. (2005) WIA overall
Women $887*** per quarter for 8 quarters postexit; 10.6*** 
percent of time employed
Men $773*** per quarter for 8 quarters postexit; 6.2*** 
percent of time employed
(continued)
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Estimated mean effects or range of effects
(per enrollee unless noted)
Estimated social net 
benefi ts per enrollee
WIA Hollenbeck et al. (2005)
WIA trainees vs. WIA 
and ES nontrainees
Women $874*** per quarter postexit; 6.5*** percent of time 
employed
Men $623*** per quarter postexit; 2.1*** percent of time 
employed
Hollenbeck (2009)b Adults $459*** per quarter postexit $1,446
NOTE: Bloom et al. (1993, 1996) and GAO (1996) are experimental studies; Heinrich et al. (2009), Hollenbeck et al. (2005), and 
Hollenbeck (2009) are nonexperimental. Earnings impacts are adjusted to 2005 dollars. *signifi cant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); 
**signifi cant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); ***signifi cant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test).
a The authors do not report signifi cance tests for the estimates presented here.
b Numbers presented here are based on average estimates for Hollenbeck’s (2009) studies 2 and 4 (see his Tables 4 and 5).
Table 11.1 (continued)
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earnings and employment. Both of these efforts have carefully matched 
various groups of WIA participants to comparison groups of individuals 
who did not participate in WIA, usually drawn from the population of 
UI recipients or ES registrants.
While the strength of this method is the ability to work with retro-
spective data, the weakness is that impact estimates may be biased if 
the comparison groups differ from WIA participants in ways that are 
not observed or cannot be adequately controlled for in the statistical 
methods. The prevalence of bias in nonexperimental estimates of the 
impacts of employment and training programs and related policy in-
terventions is well documented (see, for example, Fraker and Maynard 
[1987]; Glazerman, Levy, and Myers [2003]; LaLonde [1986]; and 
Peikes, Moreno, and Orzol [2008]). Furthermore, it is usually diffi cult 
to determine the direction of the bias (Glazerman, Levy, and Myers 
2003). Nonetheless, recent refi nements in methodology and data may 
have increased the probability that nonexperimental methods can gen-
erate unbiased estimates under some conditions (Dehejia and Wahba 
1999; Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith 1999). While the Heinrich et al. 
and Hollenbeck et al. teams use broadly similar data and the same es-
timation methods, their approach to handling the data diverges, largely 
due to characteristics of the data made available to the two teams. I will 
highlight how these variations may explain resulting differences in the 
impact estimates generated.
For disadvantaged adults, the evidence on WIA impacts in Heinrich 
et al. (2009), Hollenbeck et al. (2005), and Hollenbeck (2009) suggests 
that WIA generates increases in earnings and employment that persist 
for at least a few years, and these increases tend to be larger than those 
estimated for JTPA. Heinrich et al. estimate that WIA’s overall effect is 
to increase earnings for men and women by $320 to $692 per quarter 
for 16 quarters postprogram-entry. WIA also boosts employment rates 
over this same period by 5–13 percentage points per quarter, on aver-
age (see Table 11.1). The earnings impacts tend to be a bit higher for 
women—starting at around $550 in the fi rst quarter and generally fl uc-
tuating between $450 and $650 for the remainder of the 16 quarters. 
In contrast, the initial effects are large for men—about $700 and $550 
in the fi rst and second quarters—but subsequently fl uctuate between 
$300 and $500 per quarter. Despite the difference in the point estimates, 
we cannot conclude from these fi ndings that WIA impacts are larger 
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for women, given the uncertainty associated with the nonexperimental 
methods and the standard errors associated with the point estimates. 
Regardless, the time pattern of the estimates shows that for both men 
and women, earnings increases occur immediately—in the fi rst quarter 
after program entry.
The corresponding estimates of WIA’s overall impacts on earn-
ings presented in Hollenbeck et al. tend to lie above the top end of the 
range of estimates presented in Heinrich et al. The Hollenbeck et al. 
estimates, presented in Table 11.1, imply that WIA overall increased 
earnings for women by $887 per quarter over the fi rst eight quarters 
after program exit. Over the same period, WIA increased the share of 
time women were employed by 10.6 percentage points. For men, WIA 
increased earnings by $773 per quarter and employment by 6.2 percent. 
The Hollenbeck et al. estimates tend to be higher partly because 
program exit point is used to begin the observation period. Measur-
ing outcomes from the exit point, which Hollenbeck et al. had to do 
because of available data, effectively ignores the opportunity costs 
WIA participants incur if program participation keeps them from going 
back to work quickly and reduces their earnings. In contrast, using the 
point of program entry to begin the observation period, employed by 
Heinrich et al. and other studies discussed in this paper, allows earn-
ings impact estimates to fully capture opportunity costs associated with 
forgone earnings. Hollenbeck addresses this issue by separately calcu-
lating comprehensive net benefi t estimates for WIA using another data 
set, treating forgone earnings as part of program costs. His estimate 
of WIA’s social net benefi ts per adult participant is $1,446 for the 10 
quarters following program exit. This implies that for adult participants 
the postexit earnings increase that Hollenbeck attributes to WIA par-
ticipation is large enough to outweigh the sum of any forgone earnings 
participants incurred and the direct costs of the program. 
Both the Heinrich et al. and Hollenbeck et al. studies attempt to sep-
arate the effects of WIA training from the effects of other WIA services. 
For adults, estimates from both studies suggest the impacts of training 
average several hundred dollars per quarter after the initial quarters, as 
shown in Table 11.1. The Heinrich et al. estimates of the WIA training 
impacts on quarterly earnings are near zero shortly after program entry 
but increase over the 16 quarters in the observation period. In contrast, 
in the Hollenbeck et al. estimates, there is no lag in earnings impacts, 
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and estimates averaged over the observation period tend to lie near the 
high end of the (wide) range of the Heinrich et al. estimates shown in 
Table 11.1. Again, using the program exit point to begin measuring im-
pacts is one reason Hollenbeck et al.’s estimates tend to be higher. Also, 
Hollenbeck et al. (2005) use a broader comparison group, including 
ES-only participants as well as WIA nontrainees, which may imply that 
the difference between the trainee and nontrainee groups in terms of 
services received goes beyond just WIA training. Regardless, both sets 
of estimates imply that the average marginal effects of WIA training on 
adult earnings are positive. 
Table 11.1 also presents the Heinrich et al. (2009) estimates for 
WIA core and intensive services. The range of estimated effects of core 
and intensive services on quarterly earnings seems broadly similar to 
the range of estimated training effects shown, but the patterns differ 
markedly. In the case of WIA core and intensive services, the effects 
occur immediately and then decline quickly over time, while the WIA 
training effects appear gradually and then increase over time. The de-
clining pattern for core and intensive impacts, combined with concerns 
about the accuracy of the nonexperimental methods in estimating core 
and intensive services, lead the authors to conclude that the true pro-
gram impacts of the WIA core and intensive services are likely to be no 
more than $100 to $200 per quarter.
IMPACTS OF WIA AND RELATED PROGRAMS
ON DISLOCATED WORKERS
Pre-1995 Research
LaLonde (1995) asserted that at the time his article was written, rel-
atively little was known from either nonexperimental or experimental 
evaluations about the impact of training on the earnings and employ-
ment of dislocated workers. Although these workers were served under 
JTPA Title III (and subsequently under the Economic Dislocation and 
Worker Adjustment Assistance [EDWAA] Act), they were not part of 
the National JTPA Study. Two key demonstrations from this period 
targeted dislocated workers—the Texas Worker Adjustment Demon-
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stration conducted in 1984 to 1987 (Bloom 1990), and the New Jersey 
UI Reemployment Demonstration conducted in 1986 to 1987 (Corson 
et al. 1989). Both demonstrations used an experimental design to test 
the effect of one treatment that entailed JSA offered to all participants, 
as well as an alternative treatment that combined JSA with an offer of 
classroom training or OJT.3 Both demonstrations found that the JSA-
only treatments speeded reemployment and increased earnings, al-
though the impacts were usually short lived. One exception occurred for 
women in the Texas demonstration, whose earnings impacts persisted 
for a full year after random assignment. In both demonstrations, the 
alternative treatment that offered training on top of JSA had no greater 
effect on outcomes than the JSA-only treatments. Based largely on 
these fi ndings, Congress mandated that state UI agencies create Worker 
Profi ling Reemployment Services (WPRS) systems, to identify unem-
ployment insurance recipients likely to face long unemployment spells 
(based on a statistical recipient “profi ling” model). WPRS also directed 
UI recipients to mandatory reemployment services as a condition of 
continued benefi t payments.
Post-1995 Research    
In the 1990s, the USDOL continued to test JSA’s effects on dislo-
cated workers. These efforts included an extended demonstration of a 
mandatory JSA intervention for profi led UI recipients (Decker et al. 
2000) as well as a large-scale evaluation of the WPRS program shortly 
after its implementation (Dickinson, Kreutzer, and Decker 1997). These 
studies confi rmed fi ndings from the earlier demonstrations showing 
that mandatory reemployment services provided to UI recipients likely 
to face long unemployment spells expedited their reemployment. Both 
studies also suggested that a customized approach to JSA, where some 
participants receive less intensive services and others receive more, 
could generate impacts similar to those resulting from a consistent, 
one-size-fi ts-all approach. A similar study in Kentucky confi rmed the 
effi cacy of WPRS-mandated JSA services, with somewhat larger esti-
mated impacts (Black et al. 2003).
In contrast to the substantial body of evidence on JSA’s effects for 
dislocated workers, the effects of more intensive classroom training or 
OJT have not been fully tested for this group using an experimental 
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design. In the mid-1990s, the USDOL initiated an experimental evalu-
ation of dislocated workers served under Title III of JTPA (EDWAA). 
However, the evaluation was abandoned after WIA replaced JTPA. 
Despite the lack of experimental evidence on training for dislocated 
workers, a number of nonexperimental studies of this group may be 
relevant to WIA. For example, Decker and Corson (1995) examined 
the effects of training provided to Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) 
program participants. This study of the TAA program, which serves 
workers who lose their jobs as a result of increased import competi-
tion, was based on a national sample of TAA trainees in the late 1980s. 
Estimates of the impact of TAA training on earnings in the 12th quarter 
after participants’ initial UI claims was positive, at least for a post-1988 
sample of TAA trainees, but small relative to the size of the training 
investment and not statistically signifi cant (see Table 11.2).4 Based on 
these fi ndings the authors concluded that TAA did not substantially 
increase earnings of TAA trainees, at least in the fi rst three years af-
ter the initial UI claim. In contrast, Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 
(2005) found a positive effect of community college on the earnings 
of older dislocated workers, based on a sample from Washington State 
in the early 1990s. Their estimates imply that one academic year of 
community college retraining raised earnings of men 35 or older by 7 
percent and earnings of women 35 or older by 10 percent, translating 
into substantial net social benefi ts in both cases, as shown in Table 11.2. 
Although these results do not relate directly to the effects of any gov-
ernment intervention, they may provide guidance for how dislocated 
workers can be served effectively. Both the Decker and Corson (1995) 
and Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (2005) studies attempt to address 
a number of challenges common to nonexperimental research on dislo-
cated workers, including how to treat trainees who enter training only 
after a substantial unemployment spell. Both studies also demonstrate 
that earnings impact estimates can vary substantially, depending on the 
methods or specifi cations used to address these challenges.  
More recently, the studies of WIA conducted by Heinrich et al. 
(2009), Hollenbeck et al. (2005), and Hollenbeck (2009) have directly 
estimated WIA’s effects on dislocated workers. Their fi ndings provide 
limited evidence at best that either WIA services overall or WIA training 
efforts are effective for this group. Impacts presented by Heinrich et al. 
and reported in Table 11.2 imply that WIA reduces earnings in the early 





Estimated mean effects or range of effects 
(per enrollee unless noted)
Estimated social net 
benefi ts per enrollee
TAA Decker and Corson 
(1995)
All trainees, pre-1988 −$308 in quarter 12 after initial 
unemployment insurance claim






Men 35 or older 7 percent $3,587
Women 35 or older 10 percent $9,607
WIA Heinrich et al. (2009) WIA overall
Dislocated women −$226*** to $417*** per quarter for 16 
quarters postentry; −2.0** to 7.8** percent 
employed per quarter
Dislocated men −$199*** to $363*** per quarter for 10 
quarters postentry; 0.2* to 6.3** percent 
employed per quarter
WIA core/intensive
Dislocated women −$3 to $482*** per quarter; 1.5** to 7.8** 
percent employed per quarter
Dislocated men −$28 to $364*** per quarter; 2.4** to 6.1** 
percent employed per quarter
WIA training vs. WIA 
core/intensive
Dislocated women −$1,126*** to $69 per quarter; −14.0** to 
1.9** percent employed per quarter
Table 11.2  Estimated Effects of WIA and Related Programs on Earnings and Employment of Dislocated Workers
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Dislocated men −$828*** to −$33 per quarter; −9.8** to 0 
percent employed per quarter
Hollenbeck et al. (2005) WIA overall
Dislocated women $1,137*** per quarter for 8 quarters postexit; 
15.2*** percent of time employed
Dislocated men $1,010*** per quarter for 8 quarters postexit; 
11.8*** percent of time employed
WIA trainees vs. WIA 
and ES nontrainees
Dislocated women $476*** per quarter postexit; 7.1*** percent 
of time employed
Dislocated men $403*** per quarter postexit; 5.0*** percent 
of time employed
Hollenbeck (2009)b Dislocated Workers $541*** per quarter postexit −$8,148
NOTE: All studies in this table are nonexperimental. Earnings impacts are adjusted to 2005 dolllars. *signifi cant at the 0.10 level (two-
tailed test); **signifi cant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); ***signifi cant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test).
a The authors do not report signifi cance tests for the estimates presented here.
b Numbers shown here are based on average estimates for Hollenbeck’s (2009) studies 2 and 4 (see his Tables 4 and 5).
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quarters after program entry, but participants catch up to their nonpar-
ticipant counterparts, eventually achieving average quarterly earnings 
about $400 higher than nonparticipants three to four years after pro-
gram entry. However, concerns about the estimation methodology lead 
the authors to discount the positive impact estimates and conclude that 
gains from participation are, at best, very modest, even three to four 
years after entry. Table 11.2 also shows that evidence of a marginal ef-
fect of training on dislocated workers is particularly disappointing, with 
quarterly estimated earnings impacts consistently negative or near zero 
through the four-year postentry observation period.
In contrast to Heinrich et al. (2009), Hollenbeck et al. (2005) fi nd 
positive and strong impacts of WIA overall on dislocated workers, av-
eraging $1,137 per quarter for women and $1,010 per quarter for men. 
Not only are the impacts strong and positive, but they occur immedi-
ately, with the largest effects seen in the initial quarters of observation. 
The stark difference between these estimates and the Heinrich et al. 
estimates is probably attributable to methodological differences. As 
explained previously, the use by Hollenbeck et al. of the exit point to 
begin the observation period effectively ignores any forgone earnings 
during the period of program participation. Forgone earnings might be 
particularly high for dislocated workers, since they often have a stable 
work background with relatively high earnings. Hollenbeck (2009) 
shows that once forgone earnings and other program costs are taken 
into account, WIA generates a large net loss for society of −$8,148 per 
participant when it is targeted to dislocated workers (Table 11.2).        
EVIDENCE ON INDIVIDUAL TRAINING ACCOUNTS AND 
OTHER TRAINING VOUCHER PROGRAMS
A key component of WIA is the use of ITAs, a form of training 
vouchers, to fund training. For many years, the USDOL and local work-
force investment agencies have experimented with using vouchers to 
fund training. Under JTPA, many local workforce investment areas were 
already testing vouchers (D’Amico and Salzman 2004; Trutko and Bar-
now 1999). For example, when Eastern Airlines went bankrupt in 1991 
and laid off about 13,000 workers, the Atlanta Regional Commission 
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could not accommodate all workers who needed training, so it issued 
vouchers that participants could use to purchase training themselves. A 
study of nine sites that used vouchers for training under JTPA found that 
eight managed the system through the use of a “constrained-choice” 
voucher model, in which the local workforce agency screened provid-
ers, limited occupational choices, provided assessments and counseling 
on training choices, and retained authority to reject a participant’s train-
ing choice (Trutko and Barnow 1999). Administrators in these sites felt 
that with a “pure” voucher model, absent assessment or restrictions on 
training choices, some participants would make poor training choices 
and waste resources. In contrast, the ninth site—the Michigan Thumb 
Area Employment and Training Consortium—granted customers 
broader choices, effectively giving them a checking account that they 
could use to purchase education, training, or support services.
In anticipation of WIA, the USDOL sponsored the Career Manage-
ment Account demonstration in the mid-1990s to test the feasibility of 
using vouchers to provide training for dislocated workers. Most of the 
13 agencies in the demonstration chose to manage their vouchers in a 
manner resembling the “constrained-choice” model described earlier. 
Findings showed that vouchers were a feasible way to provide training, 
likely to work just as well as a contracted-training system, and led to 
more satisfi ed customers and staff (Public Policy Associates 1999). 
In 1998, the WIA legislation incorporated training vouchers to em-
power customers to choose their own training and training providers. 
Under JTPA, workforce agencies typically contracted with providers 
for training slots and then directed customers who needed training to 
these providers. In contrast, WIA customers who need training receive 
a voucher or ITA and can choose and pay for their program, subject to 
limitations states and local workforce agencies establish.
WIA gives states and local workforce agencies considerable fl ex-
ibility in implementing ITAs. It requires only that ITAs support training 
supplied by a provider on a state’s ETPL and that training be for an 
occupation considered “in demand,” as defi ned by states and local work-
force agencies. A study of the early implementation of ITAs (D’Amico 
and Salzman 2004) fi nds that most local workforce agencies chose an 
ITA model in which counselors guided investigation of training options, 
but customers made fi nal training decisions. The study also fi nds that 
the ETPL was a critical tool for informing customer decisions; at the 
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same time, it gave states control over determining acceptable providers. 
The study points out the natural tension between these two objectives—
controlling provider access to WIA requires excluding some providers 
from the list, but informing customers requires including enough pro-
viders for the list to be useful.     
The USDOL launched the ITA Experiment in 1999 to provide 
states and local workforce agencies with a systematic assessment of 
alternative approaches for structuring and administering ITAs, and for 
estimating effects of different approaches. The experiment randomly 
assigned 8,000 training-eligible WIA customers in eight sites to one 
of three ITA approaches. The approaches varied according to how 
intense required counseling was (if any was required); whether coun-
selors could reject a customer’s choice; and whether the ITA amount 
was fi xed or set by the counselor, as shown in Table 11.3. The following 
approaches were tested:
• Approach 1: Structured customer choice. This most directive 
approach required customers to receive intensive counseling, 
and counselors had considerable discretion to customize the 
amount of the ITA investment. On one hand, counselors were 
expected to constrain customers by steering them to training 
with a high expected return, and they could reject customers’ 
choices that did not fi t this criterion. On the other hand, counsel-
ors also had much greater discretion to set higher ITA amounts 
(up to a maximum of $8,000 in most sites) if they felt expensive 
training was a sound investment for certain customers.
• Approach 2: Guided customer choice. This approach, simi-
lar to what most workforce agencies adopted in the transition 
to WIA, involved mandatory counseling. However, counseling 
was less intensive than under the preceding approach. Counsel-
ors could not reject customers’ choices if the chosen provider 
was on the state’s approved list. The amount of the ITA award 
was fi xed at $3,000–$5,000, depending on the site.
• Approach 3: Maximum customer choice. This approach, the 
least structured of the three, did not require customers to partic-
ipate in counseling after being found eligible for WIA-funded 
training, but they could request and receive it. Customers re-
ceived a fi xed ITA award of $3,000–$5,000, depending on the 
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site (as in the preceding approach). Counselors could not reject 
customers’ choices if the provider was on the state’s approved list. 
These three approaches refl ected the spectrum of voucher models 
emerging in the early days of WIA, with the second approach most 
similar to the informed-choice model most sites used in the transition to 
WIA. To make the experiment as informative as possible, the structured 
and maximum customer choice approaches encouraged sites to “push 
the envelope” in their offerings—to adopt models that most sites would 
not have adopted on their own. 
These alternative ITA approaches generated different levels of par-
ticipation in WIA training, with greater service requirements leading to 
both lower participation rates and slower entry into training. Customers 
assigned to the least restrictive model, maximum customer choice, were 
signifi cantly more likely to attend an ITA orientation and to eventually 
use an ITA, as shown in Table 11.4. Attendance rates for this approach 
were 5–7 percentage points higher than for the other two approaches. 
These fi ndings suggest that the mandatory counseling associated with 
the other two approaches deterred some customers from pursuing an 
ITA. Furthermore, analysis of the timing of training reveals that cus-
tomers with maximum choice entered training about two weeks sooner, 
on average, than those assigned to the more directive approaches (not 
shown in table).     
Although maximum choice customers were more likely to pursue an 
ITA, they were much less likely to participate in counseling after the ori-
entation. Postorientation counseling was voluntary for these customers, 
and only 4 percent chose to take advantage of the counseling offered. 
Nonetheless, there is no evidence that these customers made poor train-
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Attended orientation (%) 69 67 74 2 7*** −5***
Received counseling beyond
orientation (%)
66 59 4 7*** −55*** 62***
ITA take-up rate (%) 59 58 66 1 7*** −6***
Average ITA award ($, among 
recipients)
4,625 2,861 2,888 1,764*** 27 1,736***
Training participation (%) 64 64 66 1 3 −2
Weeks of training 19 16 18 3** 2** 1
Earnings and benefi ts
Earnings in follow-up period 
($, 15 months)
17,032 16,464 15,724 568 −740 1,308*
UI benefi ts received ($) 3,412 3,266 3,483 146 217** −71
Relative net social benefi ts ($) — — — −407 −1,169 —
NOTE: *signifi cant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed test); **signifi cant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test); ***signifi cant at the 0.01 level (two-
tailed test). A1 = Approach 1; A2 = Approach 2; A3 = Approach 3.
SOURCE: McConnell et al. (2006).
Table 11.4  Summary of Estimated Relative Effects in the ITA Experiment
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ing or employment choices (McConnell et al. 2006). In fact, they chose 
occupations, training courses, and training providers that were quite 
similar to those selected by customers assigned to the other two ap-
proaches, who routinely received counseling prior to entering training. 
The structured choice approach—Approach 1—was the most di-
rective, but these customers’ training choices were similar to those of 
customers in the other approaches, largely because counselors were re-
luctant to be directive of any customers. Despite the guidance given to 
counselors regarding Approach 1, counselors tended to defer to cus-
tomer preferences, failed to steer customers to high-return training, and 
rarely denied training. They also found it diffi cult to constrain expendi-
tures. Despite guidance to counselors that average training expenditures 
should be similar across approaches, counselors awarded much higher 
ITA amounts to structured choice customers—$4,625 per trainee—than 
to customers assigned to the other approaches—$2,861 and $2,888 
per trainee, respectively (Table 11.4). They also reported that being 
directive was not in the best interest of customers and that they had 
insuffi cient information on which to judge customers’ choices.
Although the ITA take-up rate was higher under maximum choice 
than under the other approaches, the rate of training participation was 
similar—approximately two-thirds of customers assigned to each ap-
proach participated in training during the 15-month postassignment 
follow-up period. As a result, the degree to which the customers as-
signed to the more directive approaches were less likely to pursue an 
ITA was offset by their fi nding other ways to support participation in 
training. Despite the similarity across approaches in training rates, the 
average duration of training was longer among trainees in Approaches 
1 and 3 than in Approach 2. 
The relative effects of the ITA approaches on earnings and UI 
benefi t receipt during the 15-month follow-up period were modest. In-
dividuals assigned to structured choice, the most directive model, had 
somewhat higher total earnings during the postassignment follow-up 
period than individuals assigned to maximum choice, the least directive 
model. The difference in earnings between these groups is $1,308, as 
is shown in Table 11.4, which represents 8 percent of the mean earn-
ings for the maximum choice customers. Average earnings for guided 
choice customers fell between averages for the other two approaches. 
Average UI benefi ts received were lowest for this group, and the differ-
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ence between the Approach 2 and 3 groups was $217, on average, and 
statistically signifi cant. 
Finally, after accounting for the relative costs as well as the relative 
benefi ts of the three approaches, McConnell et al. (2006) report that 
estimates of net benefi ts were highest for guided choice and lowest for 
maximum choice, but the differences are not statistically signifi cant. The 
fi ndings provide no strong evidence that society would either benefi t or 
be harmed by a general move from Approach 2 to either Approach 1 or 
Approach 3. However, both switches would be costly from the govern-
ment perspective. The switch from guided choice to structured choice 
would increase costs because customers receive much larger ITAs on 
average. Maximum choice would also increase costs relative to guided 
choice, because the government provides ITAs to a higher proportion of 
customers and pays out more in UI benefi ts under the former.5  
To explore further the use of vouchers, the USDOL launched 
the personal reemployment account (PRA) demonstration in 2004 in 
seven states. PRAs were vouchers designed to provide an incentive to 
reemployment and increase customer choice by removing counseling 
requirements and restrictions on choice of providers. They were offered 
to UI recipients as an alternative to participation in WIA. PRAs differed 
from ITAs in six ways: 1) they were offered only to UI recipients likely 
to exhaust their benefi ts (rather than to dislocated and adult workers); 2) 
they were limited to $3,000; 3) they could be used to pay for intensive 
and supportive services as well as for training; 4) they could be used to 
pay providers that were not on the ETPL; 5) customers could receive 60 
percent of their unused PRA balance as a reemployment bonus if they 
became reemployed in their fi rst 13 weeks of UI receipt; and 6) the full 
amount of the account was fully obligated for the customer for one year 
(in contrast with ITAs, from which specifi c obligations are based on 
training commitments).6
Three fi ndings from the PRA demonstration are relevant to WIA 
(Kirby 2006). First, echoing the fi ndings of the ITA Experiment, few 
customers used their PRAs to pay for counseling or other intensive 
services. Second, many customers chose to use their PRAs to pay for 
supportive services—in fi ve of the seven sites, customers spent more on 
supportive services than on any other service. Third, sites found it chal-
lenging to satisfy the requirement that the full PRA amount be obligated 
for one year, given that many accounts were inactive for long periods.
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Building on lessons from these previous generations of training 
vouchers, former President Bush proposed in 2006 a new version of 
the training voucher—career advancement accounts (CAAs). Like the 
other training voucher initiatives, these accounts aimed to expand cus-
tomer choice and streamline the delivery of training services, freeing 
up resources to meet the growing education and training needs of the 
workforce. Eight states received CAA demonstration grants in 2006 
and piloted CAAs (see Rosenberg et al. [2007] for an assessment of 
the early experiences in four states). In partnership with the U.S. De-
partment of Defense, the USDOL also offered CAAs to the spouses of 
military personnel in 18 military installations in eight states (Needels 
and Zaveri 2009).
CONCLUSION
As WIA has passed the 10-year mark and faces the need for re-
authorization, now is a good time to review the research related to 
the program and think about the implications for the future of WIA 
and workforce development policy. The fi ndings from studies of WIA 
implementation suggest that the program has largely been successful 
in meeting many of its key process objectives, such as greater service 
coordination and customer empowerment. But meeting these objec-
tives was neither easy nor quick, and at least in the early days of WIA, 
there were challenges to accomplishing the program’s objectives that 
had not yet been fully resolved. Presumably state and local agencies 
have continued to make progress toward the WIA objectives since the 
early implementations studies. For example, the potential trend toward 
greater use of sectoral workforce development programs, in which 
workforce development programs support training opportunities by op-
erating on both the supply and demand sides of the labor market, may 
imply that local workforce agencies are more engaged with the private 
sector now than they were in the early days of WIA.7 Hence, further 
analysis would be useful, depending on the timing of reauthorization 
and how much the reauthorized program would differ from the current 
program. It would be particularly useful to have updated studies of WIA 
operations prior to any major overhaul of the system.
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Although the USDOL has initiated a new evaluation of WIA that 
will be based on an experimental design, the studies of WIA to date 
have been based exclusively on nonexperimental methods. The fi ndings 
from these studies imply that for adult participants, WIA services gen-
erate an increase in earnings and employment for both women and men, 
and the effects tend to persist for at least a few years. These fi ndings 
are broadly consistent with the fi ndings from the experimental study of 
WIA’s predecessor, JTPA. In contrast, the results for dislocated work-
ers are less promising—researchers either fi nd little evidence that WIA 
services or WIA training substantially increase earnings of dislocated 
workers, at least in the fi rst four years after program entry (Heinrich 
et al. 2009), or they fi nd that earnings increases due to WIA are far 
smaller than the combination of the opportunity costs and direct costs 
associated with WIA services, at least by 10 quarters after program exit 
(Hollenbeck 2009) . 
These nonexperimental studies of WIA are carefully executed with 
state-of-the-art methods; however, it’s not clear whether they can have 
fully addressed well-known concerns about selection bias in the ab-
sence of random assignment to WIA. Furthermore, the data available 
for these studies have various limitations that constrain the conclusions 
that can be drawn based on the fi ndings. Hence, it is too early to de-
clare WIA a success for adults or a likely failure for dislocated workers 
based on the existing literature. The recently initiated WIA evaluation 
will address most of these issues by applying experimental methods to 
a nationally representative sample of participants to assess the program 
effects.
For one aspect of WIA—the ITA—we already have a set of fi ndings 
that are based on an experimental assessment of different approaches to 
structuring and administering ITAs. Most local agencies have gravitated 
toward what we call a “guided customer choice” model, with manda-
tory training counseling but ultimately customer-driven training choices. 
The experiment tested both more and less counseling-prescriptive alter-
natives to the “guided choice” model. The fi ndings from the experiment 
show that despite the fl exibility allowed to local areas in how closely 
they can manage training decisions through ITAs, local staff are reluc-
tant to be prescriptive in guiding training decisions even when they are 
given the clear authority. Furthermore, when limits on ITA amounts are 
eased and counselors are given the authority to customize the amount of 
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training support made available to each participant, counselors tend to 
be generous in their awards across the board, and the amount of the av-
erage ITAs increases substantially. Counselors are particularly reluctant 
to deny an ITA to any eligible participant based on their training choice. 
At the other end of the spectrum of prescriptiveness, when counseling 
requirements are removed and participants are free to make training 
decisions on their own, very few participants seek counseling to guide 
them. At the same time, since these participants face fewer require-
ments, they are also more likely to pursue and ultimately receive an 
ITA. 
Overall, the fi ndings from the ITA Experiment suggest that in the 
current WIA context, deviations from the “guided choice” model of 
providing ITAs would generate, at most, modest changes in earnings 
and other participant outcomes (at least when measured over 15 months 
after training eligibility determination), while at the same time the al-
ternatives would generate higher administrative and training costs for 
local areas. Hence, the evidence supports the widespread use of the 
“guided choice” model by local agencies in the current environment. If 
there is a strong desire among policymakers for the workforce develop-
ment system to be more or less prescriptive in guiding the use of ITAs, 
policymakers will need to make it an explicit goal of the system rather 
than simply provide the fl exibility that allows for it at the local level, as 
is done under WIA.
Notes
This is a revised version of a paper prepared for the November 2009 conference, “What 
the European Social Fund Can Learn from the WIA Experience,” cosponsored by Eu-
ropean Commission Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal 
Opportunity and the University of Maryland School of Public Policy. I thank Doug 
Besharov and Phoebe Cottingham for their suggestions and Luis Rodriguez for research 
assistance. I also thank Peter Mueser for providing the data used in Heinrich et al. 
(2009).
1. The most extensive and comprehensive study of WIA implementation was con-
ducted by Social Policy Research Associates and involved visits to 40 local areas 
in 21 states (D’Amico et al. 2005). The Rockefeller Institute of Government 
(Barnow and King 2005), Berkeley Policy Associates (Macro, Almandsmith, and 
Hague 2003), and the GAO (2002, 2004a,b) have also conducted studies.
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2. See USDOL, Training and Employment Guidance Letter 17-05, available at http://
www.doleta.gov/Performance/quickview/WIAPMeasures.cfm.
3. Although the treatments in the Texas and New Jersey demonstrations were similar, 
the target populations and conditions of participation differed somewhat. The New 
Jersey project targeted new UI recipients across the state who had worked for their 
previous employer for more than three years and mandated their participation in 
JSA as a condition for continued receipt of UI benefi ts. In contrast, the Texas dem-
onstration targeted voluntary participants in select local JTPA Title III programs.
4. For the average TAA trainee, training lasted substantially longer than a year, and 
average training expenditures under TAA at the time were substantially higher 
than under JTPA.
5. The USDOL has initiated a long-term follow-up study, being conducted by Math-
ematica, of the ITA Experiment. The study looks at outcomes six to seven years 
after random assignment (Perez-Johnson et al. 2008).
6. Supportive services can include fi nancial assistance needed to meet a condition of 
employment or generate a specifi c job offer; logistical support for training, inten-
sive services, or job search (for example, child care and transportation costs); and 
general expenses in support of job search activities. In the demonstration, all states 
allowed PRA expenditures in categories 1 and 2, but only some states allowed 
PRA expenditures in category 3.
7. Glover and King (2010) describe the expanding role of sectoral approaches in the 
workforce development system in recent years.
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